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Abstract
We study secretary problems in settings with multiple agents. In the standard secretary
problem, a sequence of arbitrary awards arrive online, in a random order, and a single decision
maker makes an immediate and irrevocable decision whether to accept each award upon its
arrival. The requirement to make immediate decisions arises in many cases due to an implicit
assumption regarding competition. Namely, if the decision maker does not take the offered
award immediately, it will be taken by someone else. The novelty in this paper is in introducing
a multi-agent model in which the competition is endogenous. In our model, multiple agents
compete over the arriving awards, but the decisions need not be immediate; instead, agents
may select previous awards as long as they are available (i.e., not taken by another agent).
If an award is selected by multiple agents, ties are broken either randomly or according to a
global ranking. This induces a multi-agent game in which the time of selection is not enforced
by the rules of the games, rather it is an important component of the agent’s strategy. We
study the structure and performance of equilibria in this game. For random tie breaking, we
characterize the equilibria of the game, and show that the expected social welfare in equilibrium
is nearly optimal, despite competition among the agents. For ranked tie breaking, we give a
full characterization of equilibria in the 3-agent game, and show that as the number of agents
grows, the winning probability of every agent under non-immediate selections approaches her
winning probability under immediate selections.
1 Introduction
In the classic secretary problem [4] a decision maker observes a sequence of n non-negative real-
valued awards v1, . . . , vn, which are unknown in advanced, in a random order. At time step t,
the decision maker observes award vt, and needs to make an immediate and irrevocable decision
whether or not to accept it. If she accepts vt, the game terminates with value vt; otherwise, the
award vt is gone forever and the game continues to the next round. The objective of the decision
maker is to maximize the probability of choosing the maximal award. A tight competitive ratio of
1/e is well known for this problem (see, e.g., [4]).
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Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No. 866132), and by the Israel Science Foundation
(grant number 317/17).
†This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s
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This problem (and variants thereof) is an abstraction that captures many real-life scenarios,
such as an employer who interviews potential workers overtime, renters looking for a potential
house, a person looking for a potential partner for life, and so on. This problem has interesting
implications to mechanism design, auctions and pricing, for both welfare and revenue maximization,
in various markets such as online advertising markets (see e.g. [1, 2, 3, 5, 12, 13]).
Competing Agents. Most attention in the literature on secretary problems has been given to
scenarios in which a single agent makes immediate and irrevocable decisions. The requirement to
make an immediate decision arises in many cases from an implicit competition. Namely, if the
decision maker does not take the current offered award, then it may be taken by someone else. For
example, a potential employee who does not get a job offer following an interview will probably
get a job in another firm. Indeed, competition among agents is a fundamental component in many
real-life online scenarios.
Recent work has considered the competition aspect in secretary-type problems. For example,
[9] and [10] considered settings with multiple decision makers who compete over awards that arrive
online. In these studies, as in the standard setting, decisions are immediate and irrevocable.
In this paper, we introduce a multi-agent model in which the competition is endogenous. In
particular, the different agents compete over the sequence of arriving awards, but unlike previous
models, decisions need not be immediate. It is the endogenous competition that may drive agents
to make fast selections, rather than the rules of the game. That is, the time to select an award is
part of an agent’s strategy. In particular, every previously arriving award can be selected as long
as it has not been taken by a different agent. Thus, in our model a sequence of n non-negative
real-valued awards v1, . . . , vn arrive over time, unknown from the outset. At time step t, all agents
observe award vt, and need to decide whether to select an available award, or to pass.
One issue that arises in this model is how to resolve ties among agents. That is, who gets the
award if several agents select it. We consider two natural tie-breaking rules; namely, random tie
breaking (where ties are broken uniformly at random) and ranked tie-breaking (where agents are
a-priori ranked by some global order, and ties are broken in favor of higher ranked agents). Random
tie breaking fits scenarios with symmetric agents, whereas ranked tie breaking fits scenarios where
some agents are preferred over others, according to some global preference order. For example, it is
reasonable to assume that a higher-position/salary job is preferred over lower-position/salary job,
or that firms in some industry are globally ordered from most to least desired. Random and ranked
tie-breaking rules were considered by Immorlica et al. [9] and Karlin and Lei [10], respectively, in
secretary settings with immediate and irrevocable decisions.
Two natural objectives have been considered in settings with competition. The first is to
maximize the probability of receiving the maximal award (see, e.g., [9, 10]). The second is to
outperform the competitors (see, e.g., the dueling framework studied by Immorlica et al. [8]). We
consider an extension of the latter objective, where an agent wishes to maximize the probability
to win the 1st place, then to win the 2nd place, and so on. Our goal is to study the structure and
quality of equilibria in these settings.
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1.1 Our Results and Techniques
1.1.1 Random Tie-Breaking
For the random tie-breaking rule, we characterize the equilibria of the induced game, and show
that the expected social welfare in equilibrium is nearly optimal, despite competition between the
agents. This is cast in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2; a simplified statement follows:
Theorem. (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 ) In every k-agent game with random tie-breaking, there exists
a simple time-threshold strategy that guarantees each agent a winning probability of 1k , regardless
of the strategies of the other agents. The strategy profile where all agents play this strategy is a
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). Moreover, the expected social welfare of this SPE is at least a
k−1
k fraction of the sum of the top k awards.
In particular, we show that each of the k agents can guarantee herself a winning probability of
1
k following a simple time-threshold strategy that depends only on the current time, the number
of active agents, and whether the maximal award so far is available. By symmetry, this is the
maximal possible guarantee. This guarantee is then used to fully characterize the set of subgame
perfect equilibria of the game.
We then establish that in equilibrium, the expected social welfare is at least k−1k fraction of
the sum of the top k awards which is the optimal welfare (i.e., we bound the price of competition).
We do so by using the following two observations: First, we show that in equilibrium the expected
number of selected awards among the top k awards is high. Second, we observe that the probability
of an award to be selected in equilibrium is monotone in its rank among the awards.
We complement this result with a matching upper bound (up to a constant factor), which is
derived by observing that in equilibrium there is a constant probability that the first selected award
is not one of the top k awards.
1.1.2 Ranked Tie-Breaking
For the ranked tie-breaking rule, we show that for a sufficiently large number of agents, the winning
probabilities under immediate- and non-immediate selections are roughly the same.
Theorem. (Informal Theorem 4.2) Under the ranked tie-breaking rule, for every rank i, as the
number of agents grows, the winning probabilities of the ith ranked agent under non-immediate
selections approaches her winning probability under immediate selections.
To prove this result, we use observations from [14, 10, 3] to show that in the immediate decision
model, the probability that the maximal award is allocated goes to 1 as the number of agents grows.
Since an agent in the non-immediate decision model can always mimic the strategy of an agent in
the immediate decision model, her winning probability (which equals to her probability of receiving
the maximal award) in the non-immediate model is at least her probability of receiving the maximal
award in the immediate decisions game. We therefore deduce that the winning probabilities in the
non-immediate model converge to those in the immediate model. This claim essentially formalizes
the intuition that as competition grows, the urgency to select awards faster grows.
In addition, we fully characterize the equilibria of the three-agent game.
Theorem. (Theorem 4.1) In every equilibrium of the 3-agent game, agent 1 wins with probability
4−4 ln 2
6−4 ln 2 ≈ 0.38 while each of agents 2, 3 wins with probability
1
6−4 ln 2 ≈ 0.31.
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Notice that agent 1 (the highest-ranked agent) can always guarantee herself a winning proba-
bility of at least e−1 ≈ 0.37 by acting according to the optimal strategy in the classical secretary
problem. The last theorem shows that in a setting with 3 agents, the benefit that agent 1 derives
due to her ability to postpone decisions is quite small (0.38 vs. 0.37). As implied by Theorem 4.2,
this benefit shrinks as the number of agents grows.
1.2 Related Work
The classical secretary problem and variants thereof have attracted broad interest and have resulted
in a vast amount of literature over the years. For a comprehensive survey, see, e.g., [5].
Competing Agents. The closest papers to our work are the studies by Karlin and Lei [10] and
Immorlica et al. [9], who study secretary settings with competing agents, with the ranked- and
random tie breaking rules, respectively. The main difference between theirs models and ours is
that they consider multi-agent settings where agents must make decisions immediately, while in
our model the competition is endogenous; namely, past awards can be selected as long as they are
available. Karlin and Lei [10] show that under the ranked tie-breaking rule, the optimal strategy
for each agent is a time-threshold strategy, which is given in the form of a recursive formula (albeit
not in a closed form). Immorlica et al. [9] characterize the Nash equilibria under the random
tie-breaking rule. Another related work is the dueling framework by Immorlica et al. [8], who
considered, among other settings, a dueling scenario between two secretary algorithms, whose
objective is to outperform the opponent algorithm.
Matroid- and Uniform Matroid Secretaries. In this paper we derive insights from studies on
secretary variants in which a decision maker can choose multiple awards, based on some feasibility
constraints. Babaioff et al. [2] introduced the matroid secretary problem, where a decision maker
selects multiple awards under a matroid constraint. It has been shown that a constant competitive
ratio can be achieved for some matroid structures, but the optimal competitive ratio for arbitrary
matroids is still open. An interesting special case (which was also studied in earlier works such as
[13] and [6]) is one where the decision maker may choose up to k awards (also known as a k-uniform
matroid constraint). Gilbert and Mosteller [6], Sakaguchi [15], Matsui and Ano [14], Ezra et al. [3]
studied secretary models in which a decision maker wishes to maximize the probability of getting
the highest award, but may choose up to k awards. We draw interesting connections between these
models and the one studied in our paper.
Non-Immediate and Irrevocable Decisions. Other relaxations of the requirement to select
immediately have been considered in the literature. Ho and Krishnan [7] consider a sliding-window
variant, where decisions may be delayed for a constant amount of time. A similar model is con-
sidered by Kesselheim et al. [11], where decisions may be delayed for a randomized (not known
in advance) amount of time. Ezra et al. [3] study settings where the irrevocability assumption is
relaxed. Specifically, they consider a setting where the decision maker can select up to ℓ elements
immediately and irrevocably, but her performance is measured by the top k elements in the selected
set. This work is complementary to ours in the sense that it relaxes the irrevocability assumption,
while our work relaxes the immediacy assumption.
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1.3 Paper’s Structure
Our model is presented in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4 we present our results with respect to the
random tie-breaking rule, and the ranked tie-breaking rule, respectively. We conclude this paper
in Section 5, where we discuss future directions.
2 Model
We consider a variant of the classical secretary setting, where a set of n arbitrary awards are
revealed online in a uniformly random order. Let vt denote the award revealed at time t. Unlike
the classical secretary problem that involves a single decision maker, in our setting there are k
agents who compete over the awards. Upon the revelation of award vt, every agent who has not
received an award yet may select one of the awards v1, . . . , vt that haven’t been assigned yet. An
award that is selected by a single agent is assigned to this agent. An award that is selected by more
than one agent is assigned to one of these agents either randomly (hereafter, random tie breaking),
or according to a predefined ranking (hereafter, ranked tie breaking). Agents who received awards
are no longer active. Awards that were assigned are no longer available. Thus, at time t, the set
of available awards is the subset of awards v1, . . . , vt that have not been assigned yet. The game
continues as long as there are active agents. I.e., after time n, if active agents remain, the agents
compete (without newly arriving awards) on the remaining available awards until all agents are
allocated.
Given an instance of a game, the history at time t includes all the relevant information revealed
up to time t; i.e., v1, . . . , vt, and the assignments up to time t−1
1. A strategy of agent i, denoted by
Si, is a function from the set of all possible histories to a selection decision (either selecting one of
the available awards, or passing). A strategy profile is denoted by S = (S1, . . . , Sk). We also denote
a strategy profile by S = (Si, S−i), where S−i denotes the strategy profile of all agents except agent
i. Every strategy profile S induces a distribution over assignments of awards to agents. For ranked
tie breaking, the distribution is with respect to the random order of award arrival, and possibly the
randomness in the agent strategies. For random tie breaking, the randomness is also with respect
to the randomness in the tie breaking.
As natural in competition settings, every agent wishes to win the game; that is, to receive an
higher award than her competitors. We say that agent i wins the jth place in the game if she
receives the jth highest award among all allocated awards. Let p = (p1, . . . , pk) be a k-dimensional
vector, where pj is the probability to win the j
th place. Given two vectors p, p¯ ∈ Rk, p is preferred
over p¯, denoted p¯ ≺ p, if p is lexicographically greater than p¯. Similarly, p is weakly preferred over
p¯, denoted p¯  p, if p is lexicographically greater or equal to p¯. That is, every agent wishes to
maximize her probability to win the first place, upon equality to maximize the probability to win
the second place, and so on.
A strategy profile S induces a k-dimensional probability vector pi(S) for each agent i, where
pij(S) is the probability that agent i wins the j
th place under strategy profile S. Agent i derives
higher (respectively, weakly higher) utility from strategy profile S than strategy profile S¯, denoted
S¯ ≺i S (resp., S¯ i S), if p
i(S¯) ≺ pi(S) (resp., pi(S¯)  pi(S)). We use S¯ ≺i S and S ≻i S¯
interchangeably, and similarly for p and p¯.
1In our setting, additional information, such as the history of selections (in contrast to assignments) is irrelevant
for future decision making.
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Note that pi1(S) is the probability that agent i wins the first place under strategy profile S. We
sometimes refer to it as agent i’s winning probability under S.
Equilibrium notions. We consider the following equilibrium notions.
• Nash Equilibrium: A strategy profile S = (S1, . . . , Sk) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for every
agent i and every strategy S′i, it holds that (S
′
i, S−i) i (Si, S−i).
• Subgame perfect equilibrium: A strategy profile S = (S1, . . . , Sk) is a subgame perfect equi-
librium (SPE) if it is a NE for every subgame of the game. I.e. for every initial history h, S
is a NE in the game induced by history h.
SPE is a refinement of NE; namely, every SPE is a NE, but not vice versa.
3 Random Tie-Breaking
In this section, we study the setting of the random tie-breaking rule. We characterize the SPEs
and give simple time threshold strategies with optimal utility guarantees. We show that in the
SPE where all agents play according to this optimal guarantee strategy, at least k−1k of the optimal
social welfare is achieved in expectation.
Consider the following strategy σi for agent i, where ℓt denotes the number of active agents at
time t (including agent i).
• If t ≥ n, then select the maximal available award.
• If nℓt < t < n, and the maximal award so far is available, then select it.
• If t = n2 , ℓt = 2, and the maximal award so far is available, then select it.
• Else, pass (i.e., select no award).
We denote by Si the set of strategies in which agent i plays according to σi up to the following
cases:
• If ℓt = 2, t =
n
2 , and both the highest and the second highest awards so far are available, then
the agent can either pass or select the highest award so far.
• If ℓt = 1 and the highest award so far is available, then the agent can either pass or select the
highest available award.
We next show that strategies in Si are the only strategies that guarantee a utility of at least
( 1k , . . . ,
1
k ). By symmetry, there is no strategy σ such that
(
1
k , . . . ,
1
k
)
≺ pi(σ, S−i) for every S−i.
Thus, the strategy profiles where each agent i plays according to a strategy in Si, are the only
SPEs.
Theorem 3.1. For every agent i, σ ∈ Si and S−i, it holds that
(
1
k , . . . ,
1
k
)
 pi(σ, S−i) . For every
σ′ /∈ Si there exists S−i such that
(
1
k , . . . ,
1
k
)
≻ pi(σ′, S−i). Moreover, the strategy profiles where
each agent j plays according to a strategy in Sj , are the only SPEs.
Before proving Theorem 3.1, we show the following:
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Observation 3.1. For every time t < n, selecting an element that is not the maximal so far cannot
guarantee a winning probability of 1k .
Thus, we can assume that agents do not select elements that are not the maximal so far up to
time t = n. We now give lower bounds on the probabilities of winning first and second places in
a strategy σ ∈ Si given a time t, and whether the maximal and second maximal awards so far are
available. Let Aℓt ∈ [0, 1]
2 be an ordered pair denoting a lower bound on the probabilities of agent
i winning first and second places under strategy profile (σ, S−i), conditioned on the event that at
time t (after observing the award vt, but before making selections in time t) agent i is active, there
are ℓt active agents (including agent i), and the maximal and second maximal awards up to time
t are available. Similarly, let Bℓt be a lower bound on the probabilities of agent i winning first
and second places under strategy profile (σ, S−i), conditioned on the event that at time t, agent
i is active, there are ℓt active agents (including agent i), and the maximal award up to time t is
available, but the second maximal award is not available.
Let Cℓt be a lower bound on the probabilities of agent i winning first and second places under
strategy profile (σ, S−i), conditioned on the event that after the allocations of time t, agent i is
active, there are ℓt active agents (including agent i), and the maximal award up to time t is not
available, but the second maximal award is available. Finally, let Dℓt be a lower bound on the
probabilities of agent i winning first and second places under strategy profile (σ, S−i), conditioned
on the event that after the allocations of time t, agent i is active, there are ℓt active agents (including
agent i), and none of the maximal and the second maximal awards up to time t are available.
In Lemma 3.1 we lower bound the above terms. The full proof of the lemma is deferred to the
appendix.
Lemma 3.1. For every t, and every ℓt > 1, it holds that:
• Aℓtt ≥
(
1
ℓt
, 1ℓt
)
• Bℓtt ≥
(
1
ℓt
, (n−t)(n+t−1)n(n−1)ℓt
)
• Cℓtt ≥
(
n−t
nℓt
, n
2+t2−tn−n
n(n−1)ℓt
)
• Dℓtt ≥
(
n−t
nℓt
, n−tnℓt
)
Proof sketch. We observe that the winning probability of an agent depends on the time step t, the
number of active agents ℓt, and whether the maximal award so far is available or not. If at time
t an agent receives the maximal award up to time t, she wins with probability tn (which is the
probability that this award is the global maximum). If another agent receives the maximal award
up to time t, then by symmetry, each remaining active agent can guarantee a winning probability
of n−tn(ℓt−1) . Thus, selecting the maximal award so far is better whenever
t
n >
n−t
n(ℓt−1)
, and passing is
better whenever tn <
n−t
n(ℓt−1)
. In cases where tn =
n−t
n(ℓt−1)
, both passing and selecting the maximal
award so far give a winning probability of 1ℓt , and the agents break this tie based on the probability
of winning the second place. For the four states of whether the maximal and second maximal
awards so far are available, we establish lower bounds on the probabilities of winning first and
second places, by induction on t and ℓt.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
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Proof of Therorem 3.1. It follows from the proof of Lemma 3.1 that for every strategy that is not
in Si, if each agent j 6= i plays according to a strategy in Sj , agent i’s utility is smaller than(
1
k ,
1
k , 0, . . . , 0,
k−2
k
)
. It also shows that if agent i plays according to a strategy in Si, and there
exists an agent j that plays according to a strategy not in Sj, is greater than
(
1
k ,
1
k ,
k−2
k , 0, . . . , 0
)
.
Thus, the only SPEs are profiles in which each agent j plays according to a strategy in Sj, and
by symmetry, we get that the utility of agent i is exactly
(
1
k , . . . ,
1
k
)
, as desired.
We next show that despite the competition, the social welfare of the SPE where all agents play
according to σi is at least
k−1
k of the maximal possible social welfare. We use yi to denote the i
th
maximal value among {vj}j . The optimal social welfare is OPT =
∑k
i=1 yi.
Theorem 3.2. The expected sum of the allocated awards in the SPE profile S = (σ1, . . . , σk) is at
least k−1k · OPT.
Proof. Let X be the random variable denoting the first time in which one of the top k awards
appears, let A be the number of awards selected in the profile S before time X, and let B be the
number of awards vt for t ∈ [⌊
n
k ⌋+1,X − 1] that are the maximal so far upon their arrival. Notice
that at most one award is selected up to time nk , and any award that gets selected at time t >
n
k is
the best award so far, thus, B + 1 ≥ A. We start by bounding the expectation of A.
E[A] = E
[
A | X >
n
k
]
· Pr
[
X >
n
k
]
+ E
[
A | X ≤
n
k
]
· Pr
[
X ≤
n
k
]
≤ E
[
B + 1 | X >
n
k
]
· Pr
[
X >
n
k
]
+ 0 (1)
= Pr(X >
n
k
) · 1 +
n∑
x=⌊n
k
⌋+1
Pr(X = x) ·
x−1∑
t=⌊n
k
⌋+1
1
t
= Pr(X >
n
k
) +
n∑
t=⌊n
k
⌋+1
Pr(X > t) ·
1
t
(2)
≤
(
n− nk
n
)k
+
n∑
t=⌊n
k
⌋+1
1
t
(
n− t
n
)k
≤
1
e
+
n∑
t=⌊n
k
⌋+1
e−
tk
n
t
≤
1
e
+
k
n
n∑
t=⌊n
k
⌋+1
e−
tk
n
≤
2.7
e
< 1, (3)
where Inequality (1) is since if X ≤ nk , then A = 0, and since B+1 ≥ A. Equality (2) is true since
vt is the maximal so far with probability
1
t . Inequality (3) holds for every k ≤ n. We conclude that
in expectation, less than one award among the top k awards is not selected. Since the arrival order
is uniform and the algorithm decisions depend only on the current ranks of awards and not on their
actual values, the probability that award yj (i.e., the jth highest award) is chosen is monotonically
decreasing in j. Monotonicity follows by the fact that given an order of awards such that yj+1 is
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chosen while yj is not, if these two awards are switched, then yj is chosen while yj+1 is not. The
monotonicity together with the fact that in expectation at least k − 1 awards out of the highest k
awards are chosen, gives expected social welfare of at least k−1k
∑k
i=1 yi.
We complement this result by showing an instance of awards y1, . . . yn where the social welfare
in every SPE is at most k−Ω(1)k · OPT for every k > 1.
Example 1. Suppose y1 = . . . = yk = 1 and yj = 0 for every j such that k < j ≤ n. In every
SPE, the first selection is made at time no later than t = ⌊nk ⌋ + 1. If none of the top k awards
appeared up to time t, at least one of the agents gets an award of 0. The probability that none of
y1, . . . yk appeared by time t is approximately (
k−1
k )
k = Ω(1). Thus, the expected social welfare is at
most k−Ω(1)k · OPT.
4 Ranked Tie-Breaking
In this section, we study competition under the ranked tie-breaking rule.
We first claim that it is without loss of generality to assume that for every agent, the winning
probability equals to the probability of receiving the highest award. To show this, we observe that
whenever exactly one agent is active, she may as well wait until time t = n and only then select
the maximal award without harming her utility. Thus, it can be assumed that the maximal award
is always allocated, and the winning agent receives it. Thus, we may assume that the first-order
objective of every agent is to maximize the probability of receiving the maximal award, as in the
standard secretary problem and previous multi-agent extensions.
In Section 4.1 we present general observations regarding equilibria in this setting. We then
characterize the equilibrium in the 3-agent game in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we show that as the
number of competing agents goes to infinity, the agents’ probabilities of receiving the highest award
(which equal to the agents’ winning probabilities) converge to the corresponding probabilities in
the immediate decisions model described by Karlin and Lei [10].
4.1 General Observations
We first make observations about the structure of the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of the
game.
Proposition 4.1. A strategy profile S = (S1, . . . , Sn) is an SPE if for every agent i, Si is described
by a set of time thresholds T ℓj for every j, ℓ such that 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ ≤ k. At time t, agent i selects the
highest award so far if it is available and t ≥ T ℓj , where the current number of active agents is ℓ
and agent i is ranked jth among them2. In addition, if ℓ agents are active and t > n− ℓ, then the
lowest-ranked active agent makes a selection, even if the highest award so far is not available.
Proof. Since the objective is lexicographic, agents wish to maximize the probability to win the first
place, and only if this is hopeless, they will attempt to win lower places. This implies that agents
make selections only if at least one of the following conditions holds:
1. The selected award has a non-zero probability of being the maximal allocated award.
2If t = T ℓj , then the agent is indifferent between selecting and passing.
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2. Winning the first place has zero probability, independent of whether a selection is made.
In the first case, an agent can either make a selection of the highest award so far or pass. This
decision depends only on the number of awards revealed so far and the number of active agents
with higher ranks. For a given number of active agents, the winning probability is monotonically
increasing in the number of revealed awards. Thus, there exists some T ℓj such that at time t, agent
i selects the highest award so far if it is available and t ≥ T ℓj , where i is ranked j-th among the ℓ
active agents.
The second case can only occur if the number of active agents exceeds the number of remaining
awards. We show by induction that if there are ℓ active agents and t > n− ℓ, the best strategy of
the lowest ranked active agent is to select the best available award. for the base of the induction,
if a single agent remains at time t > n − 1, she clearly makes a selection. For the induction step,
suppose t > n − ℓ. The lowest ranked agent among the ℓ active agents knows (by the induction
assumption) that at any future time step t ≤ n, a selection is going to be made by a higher ranked
agent. Thus, she clearly makes a selection.
We proceed with several observations about the time thresholds in the SPE of the game.
Since any agent can always mimic the strategy of an agent ranked lower than her, in equilibrium
a lower-ranked agent would be willing to receive any award that a higher-ranked agent would be
willing to receive. In the threshold terminology, it means that:
Observation 4.1. For any number of active agents ℓ, for every pair of ranks h, j such that h <
j ≤ ℓ, without loss of generality it holds that T ℓj ≤ T
ℓ
h.
The following observation gives bounds on the time threshold of the lowest-ranked active agent
relative to the second-lowest ranked active agent.
Observation 4.2. For any number of active agents ℓ, it holds that T ℓℓ−1 ≥ T
ℓ
ℓ ≥ T
ℓ
ℓ−1 − 1.
Proof. By Observation 4.1 we have that T ℓℓ−1 ≥ T
ℓ
ℓ . On the other hand, the lowest-ranked active
agent never makes a selection before time minj 6=ℓ T
ℓ
j − 1, because she can only benefit from waiting
as long as no other active agent makes a selection. The claim now follows since, by Observation
4.1, minj 6=ℓ T
ℓ
j = T
ℓ
ℓ−1.
Recall that the winning probability of agent i under strategy profile S is denoted by pi1(S).
Throughout this section, we make two simplifications in notation. First, we omit S. Second, we
omit the subscript 1, since we consider only the probability of winning the 1st place. Consequently,
we denote the probability that agent i wins the 1st place in strategy profile S by pi.
The following observation gives bounds on the winning probability of the lowest-ranked agent
relative to the second-lowest agent.
Observation 4.3. It holds that pk−1 −
1
n ≤ pk ≤ pk−1.
Proof. By definition of T ki , the i
th-ranked agent is willing to select the maximal award among
v1, . . . , vT ki
and is not willing to select the maximal award among v1, . . . , vT ki −1
. Thus,
T ki − 1
n
≤ pi ≤
T ki
n
. (4)
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When T ki is strictly smaller than T
k
i−1, agent i can guarantee herself a winning probability of
T ki
n
and the right inequality becomes equality. That is, pi =
T ki
n . Thus, by Observation 4.2, either (i)
T kk = T
k
k−1, in which case pk, pk−1 ∈
[
T k
k
−1
n ,
T k
k
n
]
, or (ii) T kk = T
k
k−1 − 1, in which case pk =
T ki
n and
pk ≤ pk−1 ≤
T k
k−1
n =
T k
k
+1
n = pk +
1
n . The observation follows.
4.2 The 3-Agent Game
In a 2-agent game Observation 4.3 implies that 1n ≥ p1 − p2 ≥ 0. That is, both agents win with
probability roughly a half. This symmetry breaks as more agents join the game and the setting
becomes interesting already in the case of 3 agents.
Notice that the highest-ranked agent can always guarantee herself a probability of at least
e−1 ≈ 0.37 to receive the highest award by adopting the optimal strategy in the classical secretary
problem. An interesting question is whether the opportunity to make non-immediate decisions
increases this probability for the highest-ranked agent.
We show that in a game with 3 agents this advantage exists, but is very small. That is, the
winning probability of the highest-ranked agent is nearly the same as in the immediate decision
model. More accurately, we show that:
Theorem 4.1. In a setting with 3 agents, in any SPE, agent 1 wins with probability ≈ 0.38, while
each of agents 2, 3 wins with probability ≈ 0.31.
Proof. We start with the case where T 21 = T
2
2 =
n
2 , and T
3
2 = T
3
3 and later on show how to handle
the cases where the equality is broken. Let τ = T 32 = T
3
3 . At time τ both agents 2, 3 select the
maximal award so far and it is allocated to agent 2. Hence, agent 2’s winning probability is:
p2 =
τ
n
. (5)
Agent 3 wins in two cases. Case 1: The maximal award arrives at time t for τ < t < n2 . Case
2: Agent 3 does not select an award before time n2 (this happens with probability
τ
n/2), agent 1
selects an award vs at time s ≥
n
2 (such selection is made if and only if vs is maximal so far, which
happens with probability 1s ) , and the maximal award arrives later than time s (this happens with
probability 1− sn). Hence:
p3 =
n/2− τ
n
+
τ
n/2
·
n∑
s=n/2+1
1
s
(
1−
s
n
)
≈
1
2
−
τ
n
+ 2
(
ln 2−
1
2
)
τ
n
. (6)
Combining the fact that p2 ≈ p3 (by Observation 4.3) with Equations (5) and (6) gives:
τ
n
≈
1
2
−
τ
n
+ 2
(
ln 2−
1
2
)
τ
n
.
Solving for τ , we get τ = n6−ln 16 ≈ 0.3098n. The assertion of the theorem follows.
In the proof we assumed that T 32 = T
3
3 . By Observation 4.2, the equality is sometimes broken
and we have that T 32 = T
3
3 + 1. In this case, agent 3 makes the first selection and the ”names” of
agents 2 and 3 are switched in the remainder of the proof. That is, Equation 5 and 6 denote the
winning probabilities of agent 3 and 2 respectably. The same comment applies with respect to the
two active agents at time n2 .
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4.3 Immediate vs. Non-Immediate Selection Models
In this section, we compare the immediate and non-immediate models for games with a large
number of agents. Let pi,k denote the probability that agent i wins in a k-agent game, with non-
immediate selections, and let qi denote the probability that agent i receives the highest award in
a game with immediate selections. We note that under immediate selections, qi is independent of
the number of agents in the game.
The main result here is that agents’ winning probabilities in equilibrium under non-immediate
selections approaches their winning probabilities under immediate selections, as the number of
agents grows.
Theorem 4.2. For every i
lim
k→∞
pi,k = qi.
Before we prove our main theorem, we restate a result by Karlin and Lei [10] regarding the
immediate decision model.
Theorem 4.3 (Karlin and Lei [10]). For every n, k and every i ∈ [k], there is a unique Ti (inde-
pendent of k) such that agent i plays a Ti-threshold strategy in SPE; namely, wait until time Ti,
then make a selection whenever a best-so-far award appears. It holds that Ti−1 ≥ Ti, and qi =
Ti
n ,
for all i.
We are now ready to present the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof. Matsui and Ano [14] showed an interesting connection between a k-agent game with im-
mediate selections, and a scenario where a single decision maker is allowed to select k (out of n)
awards, and wishes to maximize the probability of getting the maximal award. Denote this last
probability by τk. Specifically, they show that:
k∑
i=1
qi = τk. (7)
It is also known that (see, e.g., [6] and [3])
lim
k→∞
τk = 1. (8)
By combining Equations (7) and (8), it follows that:
lim
k→∞
∑
i≤k
qi = 1. (9)
A straightforward corollary of Theorem 4.3 is that every agent i ∈ [k] has a strategy Si that
guarantees her a winning probability of at least qi in under non-immediate selections, independent
of the strategies played by other agents. To see this, observe that the Ti-threshold strategy gives
this guarantee, by the monotonicity of Ti. Formally, for every number of agents k and every i ∈ [k],
pi,k ≥ qi. (10)
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Combining all of the above we get that:
lim
k→∞
pi,k = lim
k→∞
(1−
∑
j∈[k]\{i}
pj,k)
(10)
≤ lim
k→∞
(1−
∑
j∈[k]\{i}
qj)
= lim
k→∞
(1 + qi −
∑
j∈[k]
qj)
(9)
= qi. (11)
The assertion of the theorem follows by Equations (10) and (11).
5 Discussion and Future Directions
In this work we study secretary settings with competing decision makers. While in previous sec-
retary settings, including ones where competition among multiple agents is considered, decisions
must be made immediately, we introduce a model where the time of selection is part of the agent’s
strategy, and thus the competition is endogenous. In particular, decisions need not be immediate,
and agents may select previous awards as long as they are available. We believe that this setting
captures many real-world settings, where agents compete over “awards” that may remain available
until taken by a competitor.
This work suggests open problems and directions for future research. For the ranked tie-breaking
rule, we fully characterize the equilibria of a 3-agent game, and derive the corresponding utilities of
the agents. Extending this characterization to any number of agents is an interesting open problem.
Below we list some future directions that we find particularly natural.
• Study competition in additional problems related to optimal stopping theory, such as prophet
and pandora box settings.
• Study competition in secretary settings under additional tie-breaking rules, such as random
tie breaking with non-uniform distribution, and tie-breaking rules that allow to split awards
among agents.
• Study competition in secretary settings under additional feasibility constraints. For example,
scenarios where agents can choose up to k awards, or other matroid constraints.
• Extend the current study to additional objective functions.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.1
We prove the lemma by induction on t and ℓt (t = n, . . . , 1, and ℓt = 1, . . . , k). For the base of the
induction (either t = n or ℓt = 1), observe that:
• A1t = B
1
t = (1, 0) for all t. Indeed, if at some point, agent i is the only active agent, and
the highest award so far is still available, then agent i selects the maximal award. Thus, the
winning probability is 1.
• Aℓtn ≥ (
1
ℓt
, 1ℓt ) for all ℓt. Indeed, at time n according to strategy σ, agent i selects the maximal
award, and therefore wins with probability at least 1ℓt . If he looses, then he selects the maximal
award and consequently wins the second place with probability at least ℓt−1ℓt ·
1
ℓt−1
= 1ℓt .
• Bℓtn ≥ (
1
ℓt
, 0) for all ℓt. Indeed, at time n according to strategy σ, agent i selects the maximal
award, and therefore wins with probability at least 1ℓt .
• Cℓtn ≥ (0,
1
ℓt
) for all ℓt. Indeed, if the highest award (among all the n awards) has been already
allocated, then the agent selects the maximal available award, which is the second highest,
and if he gets it, then he wins second place. The probability of winning second place is at
least 1ℓt .
• C1t = (
n−t
n ,
t
n) for every t. According to σ, agent i waits until the maximal award so far is
available, and if such an award does not arrive, then he selects the maximal award available
at time n. If the highest award appears between time t + 1 and n, then agent i wins first
place; else, he wins second place.
• Dℓtn ≥ (0, 0) for all ℓt. This holds trivially.
• D1t =
(
n−t
n ,
t(n−t)
n(n−1)
)
for every t. According to σ, agent i waits until the maximal award so far
is available, and if such an award does not arrive, then he selects the maximal award available
at time n. If the highest award appears between time t+ 1 and n, then the agent wins first
place (which happens with probability n−tn ). Else, if the second maximal award appears at
this time (which happens with probability t(n−t)n(n−1)), he wins second place.
Notice that the case of ℓt = 1 has different bounds than for general ℓt. We now show the step of
the induction. Let t < n, and ℓt > 1. The following hold:
1. For the case where ℓt = 2 and
t
n ≥
1
ℓt
, according to σ, agent i competes over the maximal
award so far. Assuming that ℓ′ ∈ {1, 2} agents (including i) compete over this award, we get
that:
Aℓtt ≥ min
1≤ℓ′≤ℓt
{
1
ℓ′
·
(
t
n
,
n− t
n
)
+
ℓ′ − 1
ℓ′
Cℓt−1t
}
≥ min
1≤ℓ′≤ℓt
{
1
ℓ′
·
(
t
n
,
n− t
n
)
+
ℓ′ − 1
ℓ′
(
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
,
t
n
)}
=
1
2
·
(
t
n
,
n− t
n
)
+
1
2
(
n− t
n
,
t
n
)
=
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
,
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where the first inequality holds since the probability of receiving the award under competition
is 1ℓt , and the probability of this award to be the maximal is
1
ℓt
, and to be the second maximal
is n−tn . The second inequality is by the induction hypothesis. In this case, if t =
n
2 and ℓt = 2,
then both values of ℓ′ give same lower bound.
Similarly,
Bℓtt ≥ min
1≤ℓ′≤ℓt
{
1
ℓ′
·
(
t
n
,
n− t
n
)
+
ℓ′ − 1
ℓ′
Dℓt−1t
}
≥ min
1≤ℓ′≤ℓt
{
1
ℓ′
·
(
t
n
,
n− t
n
)
+
ℓ′ − 1
ℓ′
(
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
,
t(n− t)
n(n− 1)
)}
=
1
2
·
(
t
n
,
n− t
n
)
+
1
2
(
n− t
n
,
t(n− t)
n(n− 1)
)
=
(
1
2
,
(n+ t− 1)(n − t)
2n(n− 1)
)
,
where the first inequality holds since the probability of receiving the award under competition
is 1ℓt , and the probability of this award to be the maximal is
1
ℓt
, and to be the second maximal
is n−tn . The second inequality is by the induction hypothesis. In this case if t =
n
2 and ℓt = 2,
the unique minimum is reached at ℓ′ = 2.
2. For the case where ℓt = 2 and
t
n <
1
ℓt
. According to σ, agent i does not compete over
any of the available awards. Thus, either no other agent selects an award and the winning
probability of agent i is at least Aℓtt+1, or the number of active agents decreases by one. Thus,
Aℓtt ≥ min
(
Cℓt−1t , A
ℓt
t+1
)
≥ min
((
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
,
t
n(ℓt − 1)
)
,
(
1
ℓt
,
1
ℓt
))
=
(
1
ℓt
,
1
ℓt
)
,
where the first inequality holds since the first term lower bounds the case where there exists
another agent that selects the maximal available award, and the second term lower bounds
the case that no other agent selects the maximal available award. The second inequality is
by the induction hypothesis.
Similarly,
Bℓtt ≥ min
(
Dℓt−1t ,
t− 1
t+ 1
Bℓtt+1 +
2
t+ 1
Aℓtt+1
)
≥ min
((
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
,
t(n− t)
n(n− 1)(ℓt − 1)
)
,
t− 1
t+ 1
(
1
ℓt
,
(n − t− 1)(n + t)
n(n− 1)ℓt
)
+
2
t+ 1
(
1
ℓt
,
1
ℓt
))
=
(
1
ℓt
,
(n− t)(n+ t− 1)
n(n− 1)ℓt
)
,
where the first inequality holds since the first term lower bounds the case where there exists
another agent that selects the maximal available award, and the second term lower bounds
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the case that no other agent selects the maximal available award, and thus at time t+1, both
the maximal and second maximal awards will be available with probability 2t+1 . The second
inequality is by the induction hypothesis.
3. For the case where ℓt > 2 and
t
n >
1
ℓt
, according to σ, agent i competes over the maximal
award so far. Assuming that ℓ′ agents (including i) compete over this award, we get that:
Aℓtt ≥ min
1≤ℓ′≤ℓt
{
1
ℓ′
·
(
t
n
,
t(n− t)
n(n− 1)
)
+
ℓ′ − 1
ℓ′
Cℓt−1t
}
≥ min
1≤ℓ′≤ℓt
{
1
ℓ′
·
(
t
n
,
t(n− t)
n(n− 1)
)
+
ℓ′ − 1
ℓ′
(
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
,
n2 + t2 − tn− n
n(n− 1)(ℓt − 1)
)}
=
1
ℓt
·
(
t
n
,
t(n− t)
n(n− 1)
)
+
ℓt − 1
ℓt
(
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
,
n2 + t2 − tn− n
n(n− 1)(ℓt − 1)
)
=
(
1
ℓt
,
1
ℓt
)
,
where the first inequality holds since the probability of receiving the award under competition
is 1ℓt , and the probability of this award to be the maximal is
1
ℓt
, and to be the second maximal
is t(n−t)n(n−1) . The second inequality is by the induction hypothesis.
Similarly,
Bℓtt ≥ min
1≤ℓ′≤ℓt
{
1
ℓ′
·
(
t
n
,
t(n− t)
n(n− 1)
)
+
ℓ′ − 1
ℓ′
Dℓt−1t
}
≥ min
1≤ℓ′≤ℓt
{
1
ℓ′
·
(
t
n
,
t(n− t)
n(n− 1)
)
+
ℓ′ − 1
ℓ′
(
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
,
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
)}
=
1
ℓt
·
(
t
n
,
t(n− t)
n(n− 1)
)
+
ℓt − 1
ℓt
(
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
,
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
)
=
(
1
ℓt
,
(n− t)(n+ t− 1)
n(n− 1)ℓt
)
,
where the first inequality holds since the probability of receiving the award under competition
is 1ℓt , and the probability of this award to be the maximal is
1
ℓt
, and to be the second maximal
is t(n−t)n(n−1) . The second inequality is by the induction hypothesis.
4. For the case where tn ≤
1
ℓt
and ℓt > 2, according to σ, agent i does not compete over any of the
available awards. Thus, either no other agent selects an award and the winning probability
of agent i is at least Aℓtt+1, or the number of active agents decreases by one. Thus,
Aℓtt ≥ min
(
Cℓt−1t , A
ℓt
t+1
)
≥ min
((
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
,
n2 + t2 − tn− n
n(n− 1)(ℓt − 1)
)
,
(
1
ℓt
,
1
ℓt
))
=
(
1
ℓt
,
1
ℓt
)
,
17
where the first inequality holds since the first term lower bounds the case where there exists
another agent that selects the maximal available award, and the second term lower bounds
the case that no other agent selects the maximal available award. The second inequality is
by the induction hypothesis.
Similarly,
Bℓtt ≥ min
(
Dℓt−1t ,
t− 1
t+ 1
Bℓtt+1 +
2
t+ 1
Aℓtt+1
)
≥ min
((
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
,
n− t
n(ℓt − 1)
)
,
t− 1
t+ 1
(
1
ℓt
,
(n − t− 1)(n + t)
n(n− 1)ℓt
)
+
2
t+ 1
(
1
ℓt
,
1
ℓt
))
=
(
1
ℓt
,
(n− t)(n+ t− 1)
n(n− 1)ℓt
)
,
where the first inequality holds since the first term lower bounds the case where there exists
another agent that selects the maximal available award, and the second term lower bounds
the case that no other agent selects the maximal available award, and thus at time t+1, both
the maximal and second maximal awards will be available with probability 2t+1 . The second
inequality is by the induction hypothesis.
5. If the maximal award so far is not available, then according to σ, agent i does not select an
award. Thus,
Cℓtt ≥
1
t+ 1
Bℓtt+1 +
t
t+ 1
Cℓtt+1
≥
1
t+ 1
(
1
ℓt
,
(n− t− 1)(n + t)
n(n− 1)ℓt
)
+
t
t+ 1
(
n− t− 1
nℓt
,
n2 + (t+ 1)2 − (t+ 1)n− n
n(n− 1)ℓt
)
=
(
n− t
nℓt
,
n2 + t2 − tn− n
n(n− 1)ℓt
)
,
where the first inequality holds since the award at time t + 1 is the maximal so far with
probability 1t+1 . The second inequality is by the induction hypothesis. It also holds that:
Dℓtt ≥
1
t+ 1
Bℓtt+1 +
1
t+ 1
Cℓtt+1 +
t− 1
t+ 1
Dℓtt+1
≥
1
t+ 1
(
1
ℓt
,
(n− t− 1)(n + t)
n(n− 1)ℓt
)
+
1
t+ 1
(
n− t− 1
nℓt
,
n2 + (t+ 1)2 − (t+ 1)n− n
n(n− 1)ℓt
)
+
t− 1
t+ 1
(
n− t− 1
nℓt
,
n− t− 1
nℓt
)
=
(
n− t
nℓt
,
n− t
nℓt
)
,
where the first inequality holds since the award at time t+1 is the maximal or second maximal
so far with probability 1t+1 . The second inequality holds by the induction hypothesis.
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